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Abstract 
This paper concludes a special feature of Sustainability Science that explores a broad range of social value 
theoretical traditions, such as religious studies, social psychology, indigenous knowledge, economics, 
sociology, and philosophy. We introduce the concepts of ‘lenses’ and ‘tensions’ to help navigate value 
diversity. First, we consider the notion of lenses: perspectives on value and valuation along diverse 
dimensions that describe what values focus on, how their sociality is envisioned, and what epistemic and 
procedural assumptions are made. We characterise fourteen of such dimensions. This provides a 
foundation for exploration of seven areas of tension, between: 1) the values of individuals vs collectives; 
2) values as discrete and held vs embedded and constructed; 3) value as static or changeable; 4) valuation 
as positive or normative and transformative; 5) social vs relational values; 6) different rationalities and 
their relation to value integration; 7) degrees of acknowledgment of the role of power in navigating value 
conflicts. In doing so, we embrace the ‘mess’ of diversity, yet also provide a framework to organize this 
mess and support and encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration. We identify key research areas 
where such collaborations can be harnessed for sustainability transformation. Here it is crucial to 
understand how certain social value lenses are privileged over others and build capacity in decision-
making for understanding and drawing on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses. 
 
Keywords: shared values; relational values; environmental values; knowledge brokering; epistemology; 
interdisciplinarity; ecosystem services; nature’s contributions to people 
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1 Introduction 
Social values enquiry draws upon a rich range and depth of theoretical traditions, each with its own 
assumptions related to how values are conceptualised, elicited and related to other constructs. This paper 
concludes a Special Feature of Sustainability Science that has brought together a broad range of these 
traditions. We seek to synthesise across these traditions, considering their diverse social value lenses and 
areas of tension between them. In this synthesis, we embrace the ‘mess’ of diversity, yet also frame this 
mess to support and encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration for social values as a key concern of 
the environmental social sciences (Chan et al., 2018, Ives and Kendal, 2014; Kenter et al., 2015, 2016a; 
Kronenberg, 2014; Pascual et al., 2007; Parks and Gowdy, 2013; Rawluk et al., 2017; Raymond et al., 2014; 
Scholte et al., 2015; van Riper et al., 2017). 
 
Researchers and practitioners conceptualize social values in ways that connect to particular understandings 
of the world based on history, culture, geography, experience, and embodiment (Williams, 2011). This 
means that no single internally consistent framework can fully integrate all understandings of social values. 
We adopt a post-normal view grounded in epistemic pluralism that suggests there is no ‘one correct way’ 
of conceptualizing social values; each provides a limited perspective to be scrutinised in democratic debate 
and decision-making (Ainscough et al., 2018). Post-normal science addresses complex, wicked problems, 
where facts are uncertain, stakes are high, and decisions are urgent. Today’s deeply challenging 
environmental sustainability issues provide a prime example. Here, the choices about what and how we 
research are inherently normative, because all problem descriptions partially result from the value lenses 
through which issues are viewed. Different lenses give rise to competing knowledge claims, which can be 
addressed through deliberative processes of knowledge co-production that extend peer review from 
expert-only to a transdisciplinary community also involving practitioners, policy makers and citizens 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Strand, 2017). 
 
In this paper, we develop a novel framework to help navigate the messy reality of social values research 
and practice. In the next section, we consider social values as lenses of worthiness: lenses of what is 
considered to matter. Underpinning these lenses sit diverse meta-lenses, which explain how values are 
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conceived and assessed. We highlight two key types of meta-lens; the epistemic lens and the procedural lens 
(Figure 1). We identify fourteen dimensions along which the different social value lenses and meta-lenses 
of diverse theoretical traditions can be discriminated (Table 1). Armed with this framework, in Section 3 
we investigate central areas of tension between different social value theoretical traditions as exemplified 
by papers in this Special Feature, identifying key avenues for future research. These tensions emerged 
from a deliberative global expert workshop in York, UK, 26-27 June 2018 (Eriksson et al., 2019), to which 
authors were invited representing each of the papers within this Feature. The papers were submitted in 
response to an open call for contributions (Raymond et al., 2018). They draw on a wide variety of 
theoretical bases, highlighting the importance of social values as a boundary concept (Kenter, 2016; Steger 
et al., 2018). 
 
The exploration of tensions between theoretical traditions is an opportunity for personal and collective 
growth and a means for advancing scholarship, not least because it highlights different understandings of 
and approaches to social values that may not be self-evident when those from different backgrounds 
collaborate. However, tensions and lenses need to be explicitly and rigorously considered if the goal is to 
incorporate a diversity of worldviews into environmental decision-making, as proposed by, for example, 
the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) (Pascual 
et al., 2017; Díaz et al., 2018; Christie et al., 2019). Through a mutual recognition of differences, viewing 
sustainability issues through different lenses of social values provides a richer and more comprehensive 
picture and can offer a more inclusive and more relevant value-evidence basis for sustainability 
transformation. Thus, we clarify issues at the frontier of social values for sustainability in the light of these 
tensions, providing a forward-looking and constructive agenda for transdisciplinary engagement with 
sustainability science. 
 
2 Social value lenses and dimensions of social values 
There are many understandings of social values. Central understandings include values as overarching 
principles, values pertaining to a common good or society as a whole, and values that become shared 
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through processes of socialization, including deliberation and internalization (Kenter et al., 2015; van 
Riper et al., 2018; Ishihara, 2018). In this special feature, we have considered specific values that epitomize 
the importance of particulars (contextual values) and broad values that transcend context (transcendental 
values), serving to guide contextual values. Diverse knowledge and appraisal traditions each harbour one or 
more social value lenses. These lenses articulate both what values are focused upon and how their sociality is 
envisioned. The lenses of diverse traditions can be characterised and differentiated along multiple 
dimensions of social values, such as the scale of values or the process by which they are elicited (Table 1). 
For example, a research tradition may focus on values at the societal scale, expressed by a social unit larger 
than an individual (e.g. a local community) and/or through a social process (e.g. a group workshop). In 
addition, different traditions harbour meta-lenses (Figure 1), comprising specific theories and bodies of 
scientific or local and indigenous knowledge that articulate different perspectives on social valuation, with 
their own epistemologies and explicit or implicit meta-values: values about values, for example, about how 
values should be aggregated (Kenter et al., 2016a). Meta-lenses thus frame the social perspective and 
position of the viewer with respect to how social values and their dynamics are perceived and expressed. 
We consider social value lenses and meta-lenses to be a dynamic medium of perception, articulation and 
understanding through which the world is interpreted and evaluated: they are therefore open, reflexive 
and responsive, and not fixed, unidirectional or unchanging. 
 
Meta-lenses also help us understand how social value lenses are associated with and applied to different 
purposes, exemplified by the diverse papers in this Special Feature. Some meta-lenses focus on 
understanding relations between values and behaviour (Raymond and Kenter, 2016; van Riper et al., 
2019), others are geared towards value formation and co-construction (Kenter et al., 2016c; Calcagni et al., 
2019); lived values (Brear et al. 2019); values embedded in cultural institutions (Gould and Pai, 2019; Ives 
et al. 2019; Christie et al., 2019); or value-awareness and activation in relation to wellbeing and 
sustainability (Raymond & Raymond, 2019). Other meta-lenses are critical and emancipatory (O’Connor 
and Kenter, 2019; Ravenscroft, 2019). Finally, some are themselves associated with studying how meta-
lenses are adopted in valuation institutions (Rawluk et al., 2019; Horcea-Milcu et al., 2019). 
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Although a complete discussion of the knowledge paradigms embedded within different meta-lenses is 
beyond the scope of this paper, the teleological or purposeful nature of social value lenses can be 
explained by two key types of meta-lens: the epistemic and procedural meta-lens (Figure 1), or, for brevity, 
simply epistemic lens and procedural lens. The epistemic lens considers how we harbour, create and know 
‘value’, as well as the philosophical orientation of the researcher that guides their social value lens. The 
procedural lens describes the types of processes used to attain and explain social values. 
 
To help understand similarities and tensions between different social value traditions, we consider a range 
of dimensions of their value, epistemic and procedural lenses (Table 1). Here we build on foundational 
work by Kenter et al. (2014; 2015), who developed a framework for differentiating between types of social 
values according to how they have been conceived in different traditions. At the basis of this lies 
differentiation between broad, transcendental and specific, contextual values and their indicators. This 
nomenclature extended research by Rokeach (1973) and thereafter Brown (1984) that differentiated ‘held’ 
values (i.e., guiding principles and life goals) and ‘assigned’ values (i.e., opinions on the values of 
particulars), where the first were thought  to predict the latter, both through the process of deduction and 
a relational realm of felt experiences (Schroeder, 2013). However, Kenter et al. (2015) noted that opinions 
on the values of particulars could be both held and assigned, and that values might thirdly refer to 
measures and other indicators. Further, the notion of values as held makes contested epistemic 
assumptions that they are preformed and discretely observable. In view of these arguments, the authors 
argued that context-specific and context-transcendent is a more encompassing way to distinguish between 
value concepts.  
 
Kenter et al. (2015) also discriminated between different types of shared and social values along 
dimensions of value provider, scale, intention, and elicitation process. Building on the understanding 
gained through this Feature and other important recent knowledge developments in the field (e.g. Pascual 
et al., 2017; Chan et al., 2018), we add further dimensions and organise them dimensions in relation to the 
value, epistemic and procedural lenses (Figure 1; Table 1). We add two further dimensions associated with 
the value lens: value frame and value justification. These dimensions categorise values in relation to framings 
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of how the world matters to people and differentiate between intrinsic, relational and instrumental values. 
Within the epistemic lens, abstractness, constructedness, normativity and rationality denote whether values are 
considered abstract or place-based, pre-formed or constructed, value-neutral or normative, and which 
conception of rationality justifies them. Associated with the procedural lens, the closely related dimensions 
of aggregation, integration and power denote differences in the way that value plurality and conflict are 
perceived and managed. 
 
To illustrate the relations among value, epistemic and procedural lenses, and some of their associated 
dimensions, in this feature O’Connor and Kenter (2019) investigated a particular type of social values, 
‘articulated intrinsic values’, focusing on marine ecosystems using ethnographic stakeholder interviews. 
The social value lens was the worthiness of the ‘more-than-human’ world, reflecting other-regarding 
values on the dimension of intention, individual and communal values at the level of scale, and intrinsic 
values in relation to justification (Table 1). The underpinning epistemic lens in this research was 
interpretivist and perspectivist. This could be characterised as place-based and situationally constructed on 
the dimensions of abstractness and constructedness, and the dimension of normativity highlights an 
epistemic lens that seeks to emancipate the more-than-human world. The authors deployed a procedural 
lens along the dimensions of elicitation and aggregation that highlighted the purpose of the exercise as 
feeding into a deliberative democratic process that should be used to weigh and aggregate the different 
values expressed. The procedural lens thus emphasised meta-values of participation, deliberation and, in 
relation to the power dimension, procedural justice, through which the social value lens of articulated 
intrinsic values was considered. 
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Figure 1: Social values as lenses on what matters: what is or should be important to us as, in, to or about the world, 
with two types of meta-lenses: the epistemic lens and procedural lens, and the dimensions (Table 1) of value 
associated with the three types of lenses. The value lens is depicted in two parts, with broad, transcendental values 
guiding specific, contextual values and their indicators. While value lenses and objects of worthiness are depicted as 
separate entities, whether they are assumed separable will differ per epistemic lens (hence porous boundary of value 
lens). 
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Table 1. Key dimensions of values that serve to differentiate value lenses and meta-lenses of diverse knowledge 
traditions, with where applicable reference to the Section of this paper where they are further discussed in relation to 
tensions between different traditions. 
Value 
dimension 
Key question Description and categories Relevance to 
transcendental 
and/or 
contextual 
values 
Further 
discussion 
in relation 
to tensions 
 
Value lens 
Value concept What does one 
mean by ‘values’? 
Transcendental values: life goals and 
principles that transcend particular contexts 
 
Contextual values: opinions about 
importance, which are dependent on an 
object of value and hence contextual and 
attitudinal 
 
Value indicators: an indicator of the 
importance of something (e.g. monetary, 
non-monetary and biophysical measures, 
qualitative indicators such as a ‘verdict’ from 
a citizens’ jury). 
N/A - 
(Scale of) value 
provider 
At what scale are 
values being 
articulated? 
Values are expressed by individuals or by 
‘social’ or collective valuing agents, as groups, 
communities, cultures or societies as a whole. 
Both Section 3.1 
Scale of values What is the scale 
of the values 
being articulated? 
Values can be expressed at the individual 
scale (e.g. how much does something benefit 
an individual?) or at aggregated or pre-
aggregated social scales such as value to 
society (e.g. how much does something 
benefit the people of Mato Grosso). Values 
may also be expressed at different temporal 
scales (e.g. in economics, the net present 
value over a 20 year vs 100 year timespan). 
With regard to transcendental values, people 
may have different values in relation to 
different scales, e.g. one might value a varied 
life for oneself, but in relation to society 
other values such as fairness or responsibility 
might be more important. 
Both Section 3.1 
Value intention Who is being 
regarded with the 
expression of 
values?  
People may have different values with regard 
to themselves (i.e. self-regarding values) and 
others (i.e. other regarding values, society-
regarding values, etc.). This dimension can be 
an observation on interpreting the content of 
value, or a conceptual assumption (e.g. the 
assumption that values are self-regarding in 
neoclassical economics). 
Both - 
Value frame What frame of 
the (natural) 
world does the 
value express? 
People live from the world in that they gain 
their existence from it, in the world as their 
home and stage of life, with the world as the 
natural backdrop of life beyond us, and as the 
world in terms of the oneness of being, 
people as part of nature and vice versa, such 
as experienced through embodiment and 
spirituality. These perspectives can relate to 
the content of values but also whether 
people-nature relations are conceived of 
through a subject-object dichotomy, or a 
nondual or relational perspective. 
Both Section 3.5 
Value 
justification 
How are values 
justified? 
The way that values are justified, where 
objects of value are substitutable means to a 
Contextual values Section 3.5 
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human end (instrumental values), constitutive 
of non-substitutable meaningful relationships 
to people (relational values), or ends in 
themselves without reference to people as 
valuers (intrinsic values). 
 
Epistemic lens 
Abstractness What level of 
abstraction are 
values conceived 
of? 
Values can be abstract and generalisable (e.g. 
monetary values, the Schwartz system of 
transcendental values), or place-based and 
idiosyncratic. 
Both Section 3.2 
Constructedness Are values pre-
formed and 
stable or 
situationally 
constructed and 
changeable? 
Values can be assumed as: 1) entities that are 
‘held’, ‘pre-formed’ and stable, or 2) partially 
pre-constructed as ‘proto-values’ that are 
activated and become formed in a situation, 
or 3) fully situationally constructed when 
manifested in life and in particular valuation 
contexts, and thus changeable according to 
situations.  
Both Section 3.2 
Section 3.3 
Normativity Is assessment of 
values seen as 
objective and 
value-neutral, or 
normative? 
Whether the understanding of social values is 
perceived as a critical, emancipatory, and 
potentially transformative affair or as an 
objective, empirical exercise, which may 
nonetheless include the observation of 
transformative social values. 
Both Section 3.4 
Rationality How is rationality 
conceived of? 
Rather than relating to ethical justification, 
this dimension points to assumptions around 
the validity of values with regard to 
rationality. Examples of different 
perspectives include instrumental, 
communicative and bounded rationality. 
Contextual values Section 3.6 
 
Procedural lens 
Elicitation What process is 
used to elicit 
values? 
Values may be elicited through a non-
deliberative process (stated values) or 
through an individual, dialectic or social 
deliberative process (deliberated values), or 
values may be manifested in / elicited from 
behaviour (revealed, lived and embodied 
values). 
 
Both Section 3.2 
Aggregation How are values 
aggregated? 
To achieve values at the social scale they may 
be either pre-aggregated or aggregated from 
individuals. This dimension also points to the 
meta-values used that inform the aggregation 
procedure or function. 
 
Contextual values Section 3.1 
Integration To what degree 
are values seen as 
possible to 
integrate? 
 
Values may be considered: 1) as 
commensurable and can be aggregated and 
integrated across different value providers 
and dimensions in a single measure; 2) as 
compatible, meaning they cannot be 
integrated in a single measure but can be 
meaningfully combined, associated or 
compared in other ways; 3) as incompatible, 
with comparison not meaningful (and thus 
need to considered in parallel). 
 
Contextual values Section 3.6 
Power How are conflict, 
power and justice 
considered in the 
articulation and 
The degree to which researchers and 
practitioners consider the institutional nature 
of value conflicts – conflicts between values, 
as well as concepts of values and their 
Both Section 3.7 
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elicitation of 
value? 
underpinning epistemic assumptions - and 
account for differentials in power associated 
with multiple values and value lenses and 
meta-lenses. Values may be treated as power-
neutral or as reflecting power differences. 
This dimensions also highlights the degree to 
which different forms of justice (distributive, 
recognition and procedural) are considered in 
dealing with conflict.  
 
We do not claim this new set of dimensions fully and finally articulates all possible lenses, meta-lenses 
across the vast diversity of social values literature. However, it reflects a substantial extension and 
evolution of understanding from Kenter et al. (2015), which was largely grounded in ecological 
economics, to the much more comprehensive disciplinary coverage of this Special Feature, which this 
paper seeks to synthesise. 
 
Combining and comparing social values within or across theoretical traditions can lead to tensions, 
because these traditions utilise different social value lenses and meta-lenses reflecting differences in the 
way values are conceived, elicited and applied.  Following Goldstein (2015), a commitment to conceptual 
and theoretical openness in transdisciplinary teams generates conceptual tension at various levels, to diverse 
degrees, and to variable effects. In turn, tension and conflict open up established theories and concepts 
for dialogue and revision. Lenses and tensions are closely related, because lenses can be seen as a key 
source of tension, or conversely, are themselves characterised by one’s position in areas of tension. Thus, 
the notions of lenses and tensions across different dimensions provide a useful means of scaffolding to 
‘frame the mess’ of diversity in the broad field of social values. Tensions can thus arise at the level of the 
content of values, value lenses, and meta-lenses. For example, a typical conflict between pro-development 
and pro-conservation values is not just a matter of valuing different things, as what values are included 
will be different depending on the dimensions of the value lens used, such as its scale (e.g. individual, 
communal, societal), and on the epistemic and procedural meta-lens underpinning it, such as in terms of 
what value justifications are considered and how questions of value aggregation and power are addressed.  
 
In this synthesis paper, we discuss seven key areas of tension. We focus on the following tension areas, 
gradually shifting emphasis from ontology of social values to their application: 1) social values as 
Kenter et al. 2019, Preprint. Submitted to Sustainability Science. 
12 
 
aggregated from the individual scale vs being pre-aggregated at a social scale (related to the scale of value 
provider, scale of values, and aggregation dimensions); 2) social values as discrete, preformed and held vs being 
embedded, implicit, and constructed through their manifestation in deliberation and action and 3) values 
as static or changeable (both related to the constructedness dimension); 4) social values through a positive vs 
normative lens (normativity); 5) the relations between social, shared, relational, intrinsic and instrumental 
values (frame and justification dimensions); 6) tensions relating to value integration; and 7) tensions in the 
degree to which power is acknowledged in navigating value conflict (power dimension). 
 
3 Tensions in the theory and practice of social values 
3.1 Scales and aggregation: the relations between individual and social 
values 
The first area of tension arises from a basic question: what makes social values social? Although 
interpreted differently, essentially the idea of values being social relates to society. This raises the question 
of how society and its values are represented, particularly whether societal values are considered an 
independent construct or an aggregation of individual values (Raymond et al., 2014). Thus far, most lenses 
have either focused on individualistic or collective indicators, and there is only limited understanding of 
the relations between them (Kenter et al., 2014).  
 
Some social values cannot be reduced to the individual scale of expression. As an example, take the UK 
Marine Policy Statement, which formalises a “shared vision” of “clean, healthy, safe, productive and 
biologically diverse oceans and seas”1. This signifies shared social values across value lens dimensions: the 
statement was made by governments to represent society as a whole and express transcendental values at 
the social scale, established through a social process. Individuals are socialised: therefore all individual 
                                                   
1  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-marine-policy-statement 
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values reflect social values to a certain degree (Kenter et al., 2015). Individuals may also experience, 
represent and enact shared values such as expressed by the policy statement above. However, how can 
individual values be aggregated to form social values? 
 
The relationship between individual values and social values at a societal scale (i.e., as value to society in 
terms of contextual values, and as values in relation to society in terms of transcendental values), can be 
thought of in at least five ways, which inform different social value lenses (Figure 2). In Figure 2a, at the 
contextual value level, the aggregate of individual and social values are different but may overlap, while at 
the transcendental level people may express multiple sets of potentially overlapping and clashing values 
(e.g. consumer values versus citizen values; Kenyon et al., 2001). The second perspective is that of a 
nested diagram (Figure 2b), which indicates that any method of aggregating values, whether through 
analytical approaches or deliberative processes, is bound to exclude some, typically because of power 
relations (Hockley, 2014; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016). Under this model, social values are always a subset 
of the pool of individual values and rarely approximate the totality of pooled values. The third and fourth 
figures (2c and d) depict a causal relationship, where either social values predict individual ones or vice 
versa (e.g. van Riper et al., 2019). This reflects the view that individuals represent their society but 
consider it through their individual perceptions and experiences. The fifth (Figure 2e) is a dynamic view of 
causal relationships, whereby individual values and shared social values can be seen as situated within a 
dynamic interplay where values ‘transfer’ from various social to individual provider levels and vice versa 
(Fordham & Robinson, 2019). 
 
Further research on the interrelations between individual and social values is needed within and across 
each of the five models in Figure 2. Also, comparative research between the overlapping, nested, causal, 
and dynamic perspectives will be of particular value in considering what factors influence the difference 
between (aggregate) individual and (pre-aggregated) social values, and how values transfer between these 
levels. Moreover, the use of more than one model will likely provide added insight into complex and 
contested issues that are steeped in social conflict and disagreement among interest groups (Kenter et al., 
2014b). All of these models are sensitive to the differences between aggregate individual and social values, 
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and as such, it is important for policy and practice to recognize what might influence degrees of 
difference, and how these differences relate with associated lenses used to assess values. Greater 
understanding of the differences between aggregated individual values and social values will also enable 
researchers to identify appropriate methods for establishing a more comprehensive perspective. 
 
  
Figure 2 Different ways of conceiving the relation between social values (as value to society in terms of contextual 
values, and as values in relation to society in terms of transcendental values) and individual values: as (a) distinct but 
overlapping sets of values; (b) social values as a subset of the aggregate of individual values; (c) social values as 
(partially) predicting individual values; (d) social values as (partially) predictable by individual values; and (e) social 
values within a dynamic interplay with individual values. 
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Figure 3 Conceptual model showing there are multiple levels of values–including individual, group, community, and 
cultural – that have different configurations of individual and aggregated values as reflected by the multi-coloured 
units within each sphere. The different levels interact through feedbacks that amplify or dampen the relationships of 
values and boundaries between them are permeable. Internalization and socialization are the key processes that 
facilitate the scaling up and down of values. 
 
Extending the ontological tension between (aggregated) individual and social values, we further 
complicate this relationship and distinguish social values across multiple levels. Relationships between 
individual and social values function within complex systems and can be organized hierarchically (van 
Riper et al., 2018). Previous research has identified and grouped values provided at the individual, group, 
(extended) community, and whole culture and society levels (Manfredo et al., 2014; Kenter et al., 2015) 
that accommodate interactions within these hierarchies. In line with arguments that values ‘scale up’ to 
higher levels (Kendal and Raymond, 2019), the values expressed by groups are in part an aggregate of 
individuals’ values but may also be entirely new ‘emergent’ phenomena (Figure 3). In addition to this 
ontological tension between individual values and their broader social units, there are practical tensions 
between values that exist at different provider levels. This tension is generated by value hierarchies in 
finding sustainability solutions, as well as processes for aligning values across multiple scales such as the 
need for processes to prioritize between the values of individuals versus a broader collective or social unit. 
This is further complicated by different procedural lenses on the commensurability and compatibility of 
values and lenses (Section 3.3), and on how to navigate conflict and address power issues (Section 3.7). 
We distinguish two mechanisms by which values are transferred between levels. The first is socialization, 
and it occurs over extended periods of time (Ishihara, 2018) as well as when values are  formed in shorter-
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term social processes, such as group deliberation (Kenter et al., 2016c; Kendal and Raymond, 2019). The 
values that emerge from socialization can be solidified through social learning and social norms and that 
regulate practices within a collective (Irvine et al. 2016). The second is internalization. Over time, 
individuals observe interpersonal dynamics and adjust their orientations to align with a group (Calcagni et 
al., 2019, van Riper et al., 2018). This is grounded in personal reflections and intra-individual deliberation. 
Together, these mechanisms can yield changes in systemic understanding of others’ values, improved 
capacity for individuals to recognize their own orientations, and knowledge of why changes in values 
occur at different levels of social organization (Kenter et al., 2016c). 
 
Future research should explore how values are shifted when moving across different hierarchical levels. 
This is particularly relevant in light of sustainability transitions because the scaling up and down of values 
reflects the continuously changing conditions in society and offers an opportunity to ensure the 
incorporation of multiple values into decision-making (Fordham et al., 2019).  
 
3.2 Abstractness and constructedness: Social values as discrete and pre-
formed vs embedded and constructed 
Important differences in epistemic lenses are whether values are believed to exist as discrete entities, 
preformed and held by people, or only coming into existence when manifested, including in  deliberation 
(Ravenscroft, 2019) and as ‘lived values’ in individual and collective behaviour (Brear et al, 2019, Gould 
and Pai, 2019, Graham et al. 2013). In terms of contextual values, valuation researchers have pointed out 
these are frequently poorly formed in often unfamiliar environmental contexts (Jobstvogt et al., 2014; 
Urama and Hodge, 2006). However, there is also a tension in the conception of transcendental values as: 
1) held as, a) relatively singular and stable across a human lifespan, or b) as multiple sets of contextually-
activated values; or 2) not held but constructed and manifested in response to individual, group and 
social-ecological context (Kenter et al., 2016a). This tension also relates to the dimension of abstractness 
associated with epistemic lenses and discussed in more detail by Rawluk et al. (2019). This dimension 
clarifies whether values are seen to be: 1) distinctly isolated as an abstract, discrete entity (e.g. in this 
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feature van Riper, 2019; Christie et al., 2019); or 2) not abstractable from broader cultural constructs such 
as worldviews, cosmologies or narratives, and, in relation to specific values, places, without losing 
meaning (e.g. in this feature Gould and Pai et al. 2019, O’Connor and Kenter, 2019; Ives et al. 2019). 
 
The tension between epistemic lenses that see social values as abstract, discrete and held vs embedded, 
situationally constructed and manifested has important implications for social valuation: from the first 
perspective, associated with for example social psychology, conventional economics and public 
participation GIS, values are assumed to be positive and can be isolated and interrogated (Raymond et al., 
2009). In other perspectives, associated with humanities and deliberative ecological economics, values are 
understood as embedded in cultural and institutional contexts, and the language of value ‘capture’ 
becomes inappropriate (Ravenscroft, 2019).  These perspectives are also less likely to see values within a 
power vacuum, rather considering them as part of an institutional setup shaped by discursive structures of 
power and knowledge – we will return to this topic in Section 3.6. 
 
Some synthesis between the two positions is possible through the concept of proto-values (Kenter et al., 
2016a), where people neither hold fully formed values nor are they an evaluative tabula rasa. Proto-values 
mediate between the transcendental (broad) and contextual (specific) concepts of values, and between the 
abstract and pre-formed and constructed and situated. They are not fully formed values, but exist as a 
broad value-inclination or attitude that becomes more moulded by and embedded within context through 
a key set of institutional and contextual process factors, which can include the meta-lenses of the 
particular social values tradition. Proto-values provide an avenue for allowing some generalisation, whilst 
acknowledging valuation as a process of value formation that is highly context-dependent. However, the 
concept is in need of further development and empirical exploration. 
 
Constructedness and embeddedness also raise questions about the social and spatiotemporal scales within 
which this embedding is situated. Scales influence how research is conducted and looking through 
differing spatiotemporal value lenses can yield conflicting perspectives on sustainability solutions (Gunton 
et al. 2014). Future research should be sensitive to the effects of spatial and temporal variation in values 
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and focus on mechanisms that can bridge multiple spatiotemporal lenses. Deliberative and interpretive 
participatory mapping exercises could consider how spatially-explicit social values are culturally and 
institutionally embedded. This approach could also provide insight on how values map onto the 
geographies of relevant environmental conditions, evaluate how group deliberation can synthesize values 
across a range of spatiotemporal scales, and reconcile mismatches between scales of peoples’ values and 
ecosystem processes. Furthermore, the degree to which values are seen as isolatable from the contexts of 
place, time and culture will influence the types of interventions that are considered: whether it makes 
sense to develop generalised  interventions focused specifically on encouraging pro-environmental values, 
or whether they should be highly situated and place-based, or focus on a value formation process that is 
geared towards activation and translation of proto-values to particular contexts. 
 
3.3 Constructedness and value change: Social values as stable vs 
changeable 
A further tension related to the epistemic dimension of constructedness is whether values are perceived as 
stable or changeable. This is of particular importance and increasing debate within the sustainability field, 
because the degree to which values are preformed and stable will more generally determine the usefulness 
of interventions targeting values (e.g. mindfulness, Raymond and Raymond, 2019; targeted deliberations, 
Dietz et al., 2009, Kenter et al., 2016b, Orchard-Webb et al., 2016) as a strategy for sustainability 
transformation. This debate within the context of pro-environmental value and behaviour change is most 
relevant to consideration of transcendental values. These are generally seen as more stable than contextual 
values (Schwartz et al., 2012), yet they are expressed to different degrees depending on the salience of 
issues (Trope and Liberman, 2010) and centrality to the evaluator’s identity (Stets and Burke, 2000). Both 
across and within traditions such as social psychology, deliberative ecological economics and sociology, 
different procedural and epistemic lenses conflict in terms of their perceptions on how easily 
transcendental values can be changed (e.g. Manfredo et al., 2017; Raymond and Kenter, 2016; Ives & 
Fischer, 2018). Others argue that a notable gap between transcendental values and actions (Kolmuss & 
Agyeman, 2002) makes this mission irrelevant. That is, while values may activate certain behavioural 
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intentions, environmental constraints limit their expression. In contrast, the positive psychology literature 
(Raymond & Raymond, 2019) does not focus on value change but instead on individuals acting 
congruently with their values, with congruence associated with higher wellbeing and psychological health. 
This literature brings a strong focus to how values are operationalised and behaviourally manifested in 
different contexts and to awareness raising processes to deliberate on and express values within context, 
including specific decision-making processes. Drawing on Bardi and Goodwin (2011), awareness raising 
represents a ‘priming’ process for value change and/or expression. Awareness raising processes can be 
considered across two pathways: a healthy values pathway whereby certain value types are associated with 
healthy outcomes for the individual, and a value activation pathway which considers whether self-
identified values are congruently expressed (Raymond and Raymond, 2019).  Mindfulness, operationalised 
as (1) awareness (‘what is mindfulness’), (2) skill (mindful awareness of values in decision making) and (3) 
mindset (mindful orientation), is a way to promote well-being and sustainable behaviour through the 
pathway of value activation. Mindfulness has thus emerged as an important process variable to understand 
the elicitation and expression of values (Wamsler et al., 2018) with clear relevance for sustainability 
science. However, thus far the value lens of positive psychology has almost solely focused on 
internalisation with individual value providers. To act as mediator for value change at the communal, 
cultural and societal level, mindfulness also needs to be linked to socialisation processes.  
 
Sustainability science is increasingly focused on the causes and effects of change, and values can be 
conceived of as both a driver and an outcome of that change. Societal values form the foundation of 
institutional rules and knowledge systems that are part of managing and governing natural resources 
(Gavin, 2018). At the same time, complex environmental change such as climate change can become a 
catalyst for changes in values (O’Brien and Wolf, 2010). Crisis triggered by natural hazards shortens even 
more the feedbacks between values as drivers and outcomes. As such, the opportunity space for responses 
to risks is delineated and shaped by deliberated, reconciled societal, communal and group values, but at 
the same time, crisis may be the most rapid trigger for radical changes in our principles and life goals, and 
this in turn is likely to affect contextual values. When the consequences of environmental changes become 
evident for people, they may become more aware of the plurality of values of nature, compared to 
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‘normal’ times. In other words, crises of natural resources or climate change become opportunities to re-
connect to the value of nature if the focus is on how to think and act together towards these re-surfaced 
shared values. 
 
Further research is needed that considers to what degree and how rapidly transcendental values can 
change, why a focus on contextual factors and values may not be sufficient (IPBES, 2019), how does 
value change ‘ripple out’ (Everard et al., 2016) to the societal and cultural level, what interventions are 
most effective at achieving such change, and to what degree value change acts as a precursor to or an 
effect of changing behaviour. There is also a need for inter-disciplinary scholars to reconcile the 
approaches of value change and value congruence, notably if wellbeing as a construct is considered as 
much a process as an outcome, and to relate individualistic processes such as mindfulness more strongly 
to social values, socialization processes and social outcomes. 
 
3.4 Normativity: Valuation as positive vs normative 
The next tension relates to whether the formation and understanding of social values is perceived as 
normative: a critical, emancipatory, and potentially transformative affair (e.g. in this feature O’Connor and 
Kenter, 2019; Brear et al. 2019; Horcea-Milcu et al., 2019; Ravencroft, 2019), or as positive: an objective, 
empirical exercise (M. Christie et al., 2019; van Riper et al., 2019; Raymond and Raymond, 2019), which 
nonetheless may include the observation of transformative social values (e.g. Fordham and Robinson, 
2019). Through a critical meta-lens, (shared) social values can be seen as a (shared) understanding of the 
common good. The ethical and political considerations of this critical meta-lens beg questions about how 
conclusions are drawn and knowledge might be advanced, and to what degree deliberation should be 
grounded in democratic ideals (Ravenscroft, 2019) or derived from people’s lived experience (Brear et al., 
2019). However, this raises important questions of procedural justice, of what, and whose perspectives 
should be included within consideration of the common good and by what criteria this can be validated. 
Though the emancipatory tradition typically focuses on maximizing inclusion (Lo and Spash, 2012; 
Orchard-Webb et al., 2016), this does not mean that all individual values should be included or 
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aggregated, for example where they do not serve society as a whole, or are incompatible with sustainability 
(Menzel and Green, 2013). 
 
Interestingly, a similar tension between positive and normative exists with regard to relational values, that 
can be discussed as a matter for observation (Calcagni et al.,2019; Klain et al., 2017) or an agenda for 
inclusion and emancipation of non-scientific knowledge (Stålhammar and Thorén, 2019). However, while 
relational values are rarely put forward as ‘better’ than instrumental ones (with perhaps the exception of 
O'Neill et al., 2008), the normative tradition clearly advocates social values as more desirable than 
individual ones for the purpose of decision making, as long as the condition of procedural justice is 
reasonably satisfied (Howarth and Wilson, 2006; Irvine et al., 2016; Kenter et al., 2016b; Ravenscroft, 
2019; Zografos and Howarth, 2010). 
 
The tension relating to the normativity dimension of epistemic lenses can in part be resolved by 
recognizing that different positions in this dimension typically correspond to differences at value lens 
dimensions of scale, provider and concept and the procedural lens dimension of process. Normative 
meta-lenses are particularly focused on shared and social values in the sense of value to society, formed 
through a shared social process, and/or expressed by non-individual value-providers. Transcendental 
values, particularly those relating to environmental sustainability and social justice, are important in the 
sense that they are seen as an end that needs to feed into such processes, but they are not generally the 
primary objective of study. There is a goal of providing evidence for interventions, but the social valuation 
itself can also be seen as an intervention to transform values and/or behaviour or challenge existing 
institutions. In contrast, positive meta-lenses more typically focus on either social values as aggregated 
individual values, or social values in the sense of transcendental values, mostly by individual providers, and 
the relations between transcendental and contextual values and behaviour to provide evidence for 
exogenous interventions. In a small number of studies, the two approaches have been successfully 
combined where instrumental approaches inform or are integrated with consequent deliberation on the 
common good (Kenter, 2016; Kenter et al., 2016b; Raymond et al., 2014; Raymond and Kenter, 2016). 
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Further research may consider more deeply when positive and normative approaches are most appropriate 
and when combinations of both add particular value.  
There is also a need for more explicit evaluations of recognition and procedural justice in critical social 
valuation, and to what degree, and under which conditions, the transformative objectives of social 
valuations are met.   
 
3.5 Value justifications and frames: Shared, social and relational values and 
our relationship with the natural world 
In recent years, the increasing emphasis on social values within the sustainability field has arisen in parallel 
with increased attention to relational values, particularly with regard to ecosystem assessment (e.g. Chan et 
al., 2018, 2016; IPBES, 2016; Christie et al., 2019), and several contributions to this Feature have 
considered relational values and their relation with shared, social, instrumental and intrinsic values 
(Calcagni et al., 2019; Stålhammar and Thorén, 2019; Gould and Pai, 2019; O’Connor and Kenter, 2019). 
Both relational and social strands of thinking evolved, at least in relation to ecosystem assessment and 
valuation, from increasing recognition of the limitations of mainstream economic valuation and its 
instrumental value assumptions. This opened up a fuzzy field of non-monetary, social, cultural or 
sociocultural values, largely associated with the study of cultural ecosystem services and to some degree 
indigenous and local knowledge systems, that used a wide array of methods without much attention to 
underpinning value, epistemic and procedural lenses (Raymond et al., 2014; Scholte et al., 2015). Two 
interventions signalled different directions: Kenter et al. (2014, 2015) focused on clarifying the concept, 
dimensions and types of shared and social values as critiques of the preformed, individualist and self-
regarding assumptions of mainstream valuation. While shared and social values were considered largely 
synonymous, social values tended to emphasise social scales whereas shared values tended to refer to the 
outcomes of collective value formation. This discourse (further developed in a special issue of Ecosystem 
Services, October 2016, mostly by authors associated with the UK National Ecosystem Assessment) 
articulates strongly the social nature of values and the long and short-term processes for socialization and 
internalization of values, with particular regard for integrating deliberative and interpretive approaches as a 
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preferred methodology for assessing shared values (e.g. Orchard-Webb et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2016; 
Ranger et al. 2016). Relational values, in the sense of values pertaining to meaningful, non-substitutable 
relationships between people and their environment, were considered, but primarily from a perspective of 
their shared-ness between groups, communities, cultures and societies.    
 
In a different intervention, Chan et al. (2016) defined relational values as preferences, principles, and 
virtues pertaining to relationships. They focused on the dimension of value justification, pointing out that 
in practice neither instrumental nor intrinsic value concepts captured what matters most to people, and 
that a distinct bridging concept was needed. This concept has since been elevated to central importance in 
IPBES (Pascual et al. 2017; Diaz et al. 2018; Christie et al., 2019). However, as with social values, the 
scope of relational values is broad and fuzzy (Stalhammar and Thoren, 2019). Relational values can refer 
to the ethical nature of value as being anthropocentric, yet non-instrumental, in the sense of not open to 
trade-off (Diaz et al. 2015; Himes and Muraca, 2018); or it can relate to the content of transcendental or 
contextual values as pertaining to relationships (Gould and Pai, 2019); or it can refer to a ‘relational field’ 
as the source of value, rather than the value object or subject (Muraca, 2011). Importantly, while the 
dichotomy between intrinsic and instrumental is typically conveyed as a major tension in environmental 
debates, Stalhammar and Thoren (2019) point out that these value types are somewhat caricatured, and 
that environmental ethics has nuanced interpretations of instrumental and intrinsic values that are 
inclusive of relational value justifications. As such, the ambition of the relational intervention is perhaps 
more pragmatic than theoretical, in advancing recognition of how people talk and think about values 
(Chan et al. 2018). 
 
While this is hugely important, relational values as a boundary concept has almost entirely been focused 
on the dimension of justification. In contrast, the challenges posed by shared and social values to 
instrumental values are not resolved by developing a non-instrumental concept, but by pointing to the 
importance of the collective level, understanding the intersubjectivity of values, and development of 
pluralistic boundary concepts and processes for sharing, aggregating and integrating values that are 
inclusive of multiple value justifications. As such, shared and social values, and relational values, are 
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complementary constructs both essential for inclusive valuation. Furthermore, the two are closely related; 
as Ishihara (2018) points out, it is hard to imagine any relational values that are not in one dimension or 
another shared or social. 
 
An altogether different approach to inclusively communicating values is presented by O’Connor and 
Kenter (2019), who build on O’Neill (2008) to develop the Life Value Framework, which moves beyond 
value-justifications to consider valuation in terms of different frames. Here, values are presented simply as 
what matters, and in relation to the environment this can be framed as living from, with, in and as the world 
(Figure 4). Living from reflects the value of the world as a means to our existence. Living in the world 
points to its role as the stage for our lives. Living with the world points to how we co-exist with non-
human nature, with its own patterns and cycles. Living as the world points to natural entities as constitutive 
of our sense of self individually and collectively, through for example kinship, embodiment, and non-dual 
spiritual experience (O’Connor and Kenter, 2019). Importantly, while relational values may be particularly 
associated with living in and as frames, and intrinsic and instrumental values the with and from frames, the 
different justifications straddle the frames, pointing to the entwinement of multiple ethical categories in 
our common experience. For example, a farmer clearing forest for shifting cultivation may be seen 
through a living from frame, but his livelihood is also likely to be the source of meaningful, non-
substitutable relational values, and his clearing activities could support the intrinsic good of biodiversity 
(e.g. Bayliss-Smith et al., 2003). The authors note that “O’Neill’s way of phrasing values in relation to 
‘living’ intuitively imbues a sense of egalitarianism between different values” and “its elegance incites a 
natural inclination towards including each of the categories” (p.x2). Differentiating between value frames 
is an easier way of communicating to a broad audience than through value justifications. 
 
However, further research and debate is needed to better align the need to communicate values effectively 
in a way that resonates with citizens and policy makers, such as through the Life framework and relational 
values, with rigorous explanation of the relationships between different categories. Further, research is 
needed that builds on discourses and approaches associated with shared and social values to find ways of 
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resolving practical tensions in sustainability practice between different value justifications and frames, 
enabling more effective value integration. 
 
 
Figure 4 The Life Value Framework, and the relation between its four frames and instrumental, relational and 
intrinsic value justifications (adapted from O’Connor and Kenter, 2019). 
 
3.6 Value integration and rationalities 
Different forms of value integration were presented in this Special Feature. Papers examined the 
integration of different types of values, including for example across different scales of values (van Riper 
et al., 2019) and provider (Kendal & Raymond, 2019; Fordham & Robinson, 2019) and across different 
value justifications (Christie, et al., 2019; O’Connor & Kenter, 2019; Kronenberg & Andersson, 2019). 
Integration becomes more complex when aligning between epistemic lenses that differ in terms of 
abstractness and constructedness (Rawluk et al., 2019), for example between values that are lived or 
embodied, where value is seen as dynamically situated (Raymond et al., 2017) and more objective 
approaches where values are seen as stable across situations. Such questions point to an urgent need to 
consider new forms of value integration. Gunton et al. (2017) argued that we need value frameworks that 
can integrate the place of interest and the scale and subject of interest. They propose a suite of 
considerations for valuing ecosystems (e.g. social, economic, aesthetic, jural, sensory, symbolic), to be 
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compared with different stakeholder groups and across different types of places. These frameworks point 
to the difference between concept and method integration (Kronenberg and Andersson, 2019; Davies et 
al., 2017; Guerreto et al., 2018), although arguably methodological integration needs to be underpinned by 
conceptual integration, at least if one wishes to avoid unconscious pragmatism where no attention is given 
to how tensions along different lenses are resolved (Raymond et al., 2014). Most social values for 
sustainability papers do not discuss the interface between conceptual and methodological integration, and 
this is an important avenue for future research. 
 
Value integration can achieve different levels or purposes. Kronenberg and Andersson (2019) outlined the 
potential for commensurability, compatibility and parallel use, and the methods that can be employed to navigate 
each. Each integration level can be informed by a different epistemic lens perspective, particularly with 
regard to rationality. Commensurability is strongly tied to instrumental rationality (Lockwood 2005). Values 
can be treated as commensurable if they are measured according to a common scale and thus aggregated 
into a single value indicator, for example in monetary approaches and many forms of multi-criteria 
analysis (Kenter et al., 2014a). In contrast, value compatibility is linked with bounded rationality, where doing 
well enough rather than optimising choices is inevitable in many contexts (Simon, 1984). Here, 
incommensurable values may be compared ordinally or nominally (e.g. improvement vs degradation). For 
example, M. Christie et al. (2019) compare multiple values of nature’s contributions to people across 
Europe. A third value integration rationality involves communication and deliberative democracy (see 
Ecosystem Services, 2016, Special Issue on shared values and deliberative valuation). Irvine et al. (2016), 
Kenter (2016) and in this Feature Ravenscroft (2019) point out philosophical challenges around value 
integration, relating to how much different representations and value criteria count, urging further 
investigations of how deliberative valuations can act as new democratic spaces for integration based on 
social learning and communicative rationality, where values are weighted on the basis of the force of argument 
rather than analytical criteria and ideals of non-coercion and inclusivity determine to what degree 
outcomes are rational. 
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Given these different value integration rationalities, how can policymakers recognise the diverse values of 
nature?  Here, we need to accept the rationality of ‘value pluralism’ in that value diversity is an outcome 
itself. Diverse authors (e.g. Williams, 1982; Larmore, 1987; Kekes, 1993; Stocker, 1997) have argued that 
conflicts between values can be irresolvable. The notion of moral conflict (Stocker, 1990) suggests that 
ethics need not always be action guiding. Instead, respecting plurality involves recognition of diverse 
pathways of policy formation and implementation. This will require a shift in the culture of policy making 
and associated capacity building to promote awareness of diverse value traditions and practice in grappling 
with multiple value lenses and meta-lenses. 
 
3.7 Values, conflict and power 
The consideration of plural values and the challenges of integrating them with each other and into 
decisions raises key institutional questions of power in navigating such conflicts. Despite real 
consequences, the interplay between values and power continue to be neglected, especially in empirical 
valuation studies. This is in part due to the multifaceted nature of both values and power. Power can be 
both overt and almost imperceptible and exercised through hegemonically privileging certain lenses and 
meta-lenses (Foucault, 1980; Lukes, 2001). Power dynamics can influence whose values are expressed or 
recognised, and which values emerge in contexts, though this is not necessarily transparent. Researchers 
and practitioners of sustainability science must become attuned to recognising and navigating power as 
expressed through values and the lenses by which we examine them. 
 
The interplay between social values and power can occur in many ways. A dominant scientific framing of 
sustainability challenges privileges one way of knowing, which can depoliticise inherently political 
challenges (Sletto, 2008). Examples include the concepts of the Anthropocene (Haraway, 2015; Davis and 
Todd, 2017) and sustainability itself (Farreira, 2017), which homogenise social drivers apolitically. 
Unconsciously privileging one set of social values lenses over others can manifest in social-ecological 
injustices (Collard et al., 2018). Further, certain values (e.g. economic, moral, religious, scientific etc.) of 
particular groups (e.g. different social classes) will be considered in policy and decision-making through 
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the exercise of power, for example through privileging of economic value above all else (Demaria, 2010). 
In contrast, values associated with indigenous and local knowledge systems are often ignored in decision 
making (M. Christie et al., 2019). Further, normative meta-lenses, including ideas of social memory and 
how the future should be (Rawluk & Curtis, 2017), can cause people to silence values that don’t match 
expectations, including in deliberative processes (Orchard-Webb et al., 2016; Brear et al., 2019). There are 
many ways in which power can be exercised in order to direct, control or regulate the conduct of people, 
in overt and subtle ways.  For example, through discursive strategies of power-knowledge embedded in 
different ‘governmentalities’, such as Sovereignty, Discipline, Neoliberalism, and, Truth as an art of 
government (Foucault, 2008). According to different technologies of power exerted in a historical context, 
these governmentalities affect the values that people are able to adopt in their lives. Given that values are 
crucial aspects of the choices, decisions, and behaviours of people related to sustainability, the interplay 
between how power is exercised, the values that people adopt, and the construction of individuals’ 
identities, is key to understand environmental governance and its outcomes (Agrawal, 2005; D’Alisa and 
Kallis, 2016).  
 
While ontological and epistemological differences can be a source of contestation (Rawluk et al., 2019), 
tensions around power inevitably arise in relation to any form of social values assessment in practice, 
though are often not acknowledged. In particular, there is a need for more attention to power relations in 
diverse processes of value formation, socialisation and internalisation, such as in this Feature by Calcagni 
et al. (2019) who consider the impact of communication or market strategies influencing value creation on 
social media. Even in deliberative value formation characterised by ideals of non-coercive communicative 
rationality, such ideals can only be approximated, as in the real-world, unconscious power relations cannot 
be fully ironed out (Orchard-Webb et al., 2016). Further, in sustainability practice, an important barrier for 
realising pro-sustainability social values are people’s limited power and control to change their 
unsustainable practices resulting from unmet well-being related needs (Brear et al., 2019, Huxley and 
Yiftachel 2000). 
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Thus, sustainability that manifests social-ecological justice requires centring on both social values and 
power. If other-regarding transcendental values that underpin the ethos of sustainability, such as equity, 
generosity and care are to be promoted, there is a precursory need to transparently observe diversities of 
values and needs alongside privileging mechanisms of power. In the field of valuation, scholars more 
often engaged with (post-)positivist research may need to become more comfortable with relational and 
post-structuralist meta-lenses, since power is observed more easily through these (Foucault, 1980). In line 
with Geels et al. (2017) and Smith and Berkhout (2005), considering values through multiple value, 
epistemic and procedural lenses is critical because socio-technical transition pathways towards sustainable 
systems imply necessarily value-oriented governance systems, which are affected by the interplays between 
technologies of power, the institutional system, and the processes of pro-sustainability value socialization 
(Everard et al., 2016).  
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have considered key theoretical and practical tensions in the burgeoning field of social 
values of sustainability. These tensions relate to important dimensions of values that characterise the 
lenses and epistemic and procedural meta-lenses through which different traditions conceive and perceive 
these values, exemplified by the diverse contributions to this Special Feature of Sustainability Science. Key 
avenues for future research relating to these tensions include: 
1. Exploration of relations between collective and individual values, and the dynamic internalization 
and socialization processes by which values transfer up and down between individuals and 
multiple social scales of value provider; 
2. Investigation of crisis-triggers for pro-sustainability value-change and levers for ‘rippling out’ 
changes; 
3. Conceptual development and empirical exploration of proto-values; 
4. Application of interventions based on value awareness, activation and congruence within 
sustainability contexts and their upscaling from individualistic to social; 
5. Evaluation of values-based interventions that take a generalised vs place-based perspective; 
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6. Further development of the Life Framework as a novel way of organising and communicating 
why the natural world matters; 
7. The interface between value, conceptual and methodological pluralism, value integration and 
comparative and combined use of multiple rationalities for valuation; 
8. Deliberative mechanisms to address conflicts between values at different spatiotemporal and 
social scales, between different value justifications and Life Frames and between different value 
and epistemic lenses;  
9. More explicit evaluations of recognition and procedural justice in critical social valuation, and 
under which conditions transformative objectives of social valuations are met; 
10. The interplay between how power is exercised and the values that people adopt across different 
institutions and contexts;  
11. The development of new languages of nature valuation that are better reflective of relational, 
constructivist and structuralist epistemic perspectives; 
12. Understanding mechanisms whereby certain lenses are privileged over others in different 
decision-contexts, and capacity building for understanding and drawing on multiple value, 
epistemic and procedural lenses in decision-making.  
 
The large number of dimensions of values that these questions point to reflect that sustainability issues are 
by and large complex and wicked problems. Addressing such issues requires us to navigate transcendental 
and contextual values at multiple spatiotemporal scales, between individuals and collectives, across 
different potentially conflicting value justifications, frames and rationalities, and with close attention to 
power relations in such conflicts, both within and between different value articulating institutions. 
Effective navigation requires charts, beacons and experience. This paper has sought to scout the terrain 
providing a multidimensional interpretation of the messy social values landscape. Such a map is crucial in 
communicating with fellow travellers where one is, in the sense of what values one is articulating and from 
which vantage point. Understanding of tensions provides beacons to shed light on crucial areas of 
conflict, where we need to pay particular attention in our journeys of sustainability science and practice. At 
these points, experience of engaging not just with the landscape and its map but with fellow travellers 
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becomes vital, as the terrain is too challenging for any tradition to tackle on its own. Crucially, all values 
around sustainability have a social dimension. A juxtaposition between individual instrumental values and 
social, shared, cultural, non-instrumental or relational values is thus not helpful – rather we must help each 
other understand what dimensions of the value landscape we are viewing and through what lens. At these 
junctions, by loving the mess and enjoying the thrill of exploration, conflict can become a space of 
creative dynamism where new concepts, methods and tools can be born. The mess does not need 
resolving but engaging with. This requires building capacity with researchers and practitioners: learning to 
navigate and learning to love, by embracing the plurality of how we conceive and articulate values in 
research, decision mechanisms and boundary spaces – all are ultimately social processes of valuation. 
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